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ABSTRACT 
Vertical collaborations in supply chains imply the achievement of mutual benefits for the participating partners such 
as increasing sales, reducing costs and risks and improving the overall performance. However, the benefits are 
sometimes difficult to gain due to existing differences in interests and goals of the individual chain members.  Thus, 
conflicts are inevitable. Power can be seen as one of the mechanisms to resolve conflicts in supply chains. By and 
large, the findings provide support that power could have a profound impact on conflict resolution in vertical 
collaborations. However, in order to successfully resolve conflicts the knowledge of different power types is 
essential. 
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1 Introduction  
Vertical collaborations in supply chains imply the achievement of mutual benefits for the participating 
partners such as increasing sales, reducing costs and risks and improving the overall performance. 
However, the benefits are sometimes difficult to gain due to existing differences in interests and goals of 
the individual chain members. Each firm tries to maximize its own profit and to minimize its own costs 
which may occur at the expense of other actors' profitability. Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) named two 
important reasons for these existing difficulties: the heterogeneity of business partners and the dynamics 
of the whole system. Since members are different from one another in many ways (resources, objectives, 
capabilities, etc.), the conflicts are inevitable. Examples of conflict between supply chain members may 
include such issues as disputes over maintenance of inventory levels, discount merchandising, 
representational policies, prices (Stern et al., 1973) or product quality, customer relations, hours of 
operation (Lusch, 1976). One can say that conflicts in supply chains and marketing channels have been 
dealt with as a pervasive phenomenon. 
Power can be seen as one of the mechanisms to resolve conflicts in supply chains, since it can be considered to 
be one of the strongest and most influential tools for managing business-to-business relationships. Its 
importance is underlined by many scientists who refer to power as a key behavioural construct which is a 
driver for improved networking and better performance and has a significant impact on buyer-supplier 
relationships (Etgar, 1976; Liu and Wang, 2000). According to Cox (2002) power is at the heart of any business-
to-business relationship and that power can be used very effectively to achieve a better deal between buyers 
and suppliers in supply chains. The biggest advantage of using power could be its commanding nature which is 
perfectly suited for completing specific managerial tasks. Nevertheless, the actual role of power in business-to-
business relationships has been treated in contrasting ways in the literature. For many decades there has been 
a discussion going on about the positive and negative aspects of power (Craig and Gabler, 1963).  
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In the endeavour to investigate the role of power for conflict resolution we turn to the example of Russian 
agrifood-business. The Russian example shows that power asymmetries within supply chains result in 
many different conflicts. In Russia suppliers traditionally are used to occupying a strong position in 
relationships with domestic buyers. The empirical findings of Popova and Sorensen (2001) demonstrate 
that Russian suppliers are in a stronger and more dominant position and have the upper hand in the 
negotiation of contracts with buyers. This fact is also supported by Kouchtch (2005) who discusses the 
evolution of industrial companies’ relationships with suppliers and defines their trend of development in 
the view of transformation process relationships among Russian industrial companies and their suppliers. 
He notes that Russian suppliers’ powerful position on the market is due to the supreme significance of the 
raw materials market. Among some of the reasons of suppliers’ powerful position in Russia are weak 
enforcement of contracts, low transparency of legal system, and persisting corruption (Tretyak and 
Sheresheva, 2004), insufficient quality of delivered goods (Struck and Strubenhoff, 2002), difficulties in 
obtaining supplies and raw materials (McCarthy et al., 1993), and a supply chain characterized by distrust 
and absence of professionalism (Tretyak and Sheresheva, 2004).  
Hence, the aim of our paper is to investigate the role of power in resolving conflictful situations arising in 
supply chains and to work out recommendations for managers about how to use power as a tool for 
conflict resolution. Russian agri-food processor-supplier relationships serve as an empirical setting for our 
research. The structure of our papers is as follows. In the next chapter, we study power and conflict  and 
develop a set of hypotheses which are tested in the empirical part of the paper. The article ends with a 
discussion and concluding remarks. 
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Power and conflict  
Power generally refers to the ability, capacity or potential to get others do something, to comma nd, to 
influence, to determine or to control the behaviours, intentions, decisions or actions of others in the 
pursuit of one's own goals or interests despite resistance, as well as to induce changes (Belaya and Hanf, 
2009). However, it is not enough to talk about power in the generic sense. It is necessary to be specific 
about the nature of the power. French and Raven (1959) and Raven and Kruglanski (1970) used the 
following classification of power: coercive, reward, expert, informational, legitimate and r eferent. They 
say that power is derived from the more dependent firm’s perception of the dominant firm’s ability to 
mediate rewards, mediate punishment, its legitimate right to prescribe behaviour, some specific 
knowledge or expertise, and the extent to which the more dependent firm identifies with the dominant 
firm.  
Johnson et al. (1993) developed the classification power into mediated (coercive, reward, legal legitimate) 
and non-mediated power (expert, informational, referent, traditional legitimate power) (figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of power by Johnson et al. (1993) (Source: Own illustration based on Johnson et al., 1993) 
 
Coercive power enables a power holder to mediate punishments to others: for example, to dismiss, 
suspend, or reprimand them, or to make them carry out unpleasant tasks. It is usually based on the 
expectation of punishments and/or threats and relies on the belief that punishments will be forthcoming 
or rewards will be withheld unless the requested behaviour is exhibited (French and Raven, 1959).  
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Reward power depends on the ability of the power holder to offer or mediate rewards to others. It is 
based on the degree to which the individual can give others a reward of some kind such as 
recommendations, desired gifts, and increases in pay or responsibility. If a focal company can mediate 
rewards due to the access to resources which are valuable to other actors, then it can make the actors 
perform in the way the company desires.  
Legal legitimate power is based on a system of rules that is applied in accordance with legal principles or 
laws. It stems from a legitimate right to influence and an obligation to accept this influence(French and 
Raven, 1959).  
Expert power is derived from the skills or special knowledge of the power holder in a specific subject. This 
knowledge applies to the restricted area in which the specialist is trained or qualified. In the case of a 
supply chain network, the expert power of a focal actor depends on the perception of other actors that it 
possesses a special expertise (Belaya and Hanf, 2012).  
Informational power stems from the ability to explicate information not previously available and the 
ability to demonstrate the logic of suggested actions with this information (Raven and Kruglanski, 1970). 
They believe that even though the difference between expert and informational power is subtle, the 
power holder tends to be well-informed, possess up-to-date information and can, therefore, persuade 
others. The difference between these two types of power can be observed when the power holder 
wanting to apply expert power may develop credibility and trust through image and respect, while the 
power holder wanting to apply informational power may not.  
Referent power is based on an individual’s ability to be attractive to others and depend s on the charisma 
and interpersonal skills of the power holder. French and Raven (1959) define the source of referent power 
as “a feeling of oneness or a desire for such an identity”. It is difficult to identify specific instances of pure 
referent power in interfirm relationships, since it usually occurs in conjunction with other kinds of power 
and plays a stabilizing role (Beier and Stern, 1969).  
Traditional legitimate power derives from societal customs, commonly accepted codes or standards and 
usually involves positions and not the personal qualities of individuals. It i s also sometimes called 
"position power" and is usually accompanied by various attributes such as uniforms, offices, etc.  For 
instance, at some food markets a small number of the biggest companies hold a significant share of the 
market, which allows them to enjoy a powerful position (Glauben and Loy, 2001). 
This dichotomization of power was also extensively used by a number of scientists in the context of 
marketing channels and supply chains (Maloni and Benton, 2000; Zhao et al., 2008). Non -mediated power 
is different from the mediated power in the way that it is not specificallyexercised or threatened to 
manipulate the target (Maloni and Benton, 2000). In fact, coercive and reward power represent the use of 
sanctions. In the case of coercive power the sanctions are negative and the reward power implies the use 
of positive sanctions. Legitimate power is the only kind of power among the remaining kinds which also 
refers to the use of sanctions (Saam, 2007), but the legal character of sanctions is apparently mo re 
effective than the traditional one. Thus, non-mediated power can be viewed as a possibility or potential, 
whereas the mediated power represents the direct action or in other words the intentional use of power 
by the powerful actor. 
Some scholars argued that using power in supply chains may be effective in some cases, however it can 
also yield unwanted side effects, such as evoking conflict (Gaski, 1984, Hunt and Nevin, 1974) and 
opportunistic or defensive behaviour of the less powerful actors (Ojala and Hallikas, 2007). Conflict may 
be defined as a disunity caused by competitive or opposing action (Maloni and Benton, 2000) or a as the 
actual or threatened use of force (Dubin, 1960). Lusch (1976) defined conflict operationally as the 
frequency of disagreement between manufacturer and dealer over numerous issues. The causes of 
conflict are rooted in the incompatibilities of beliefs, values, and goals, or in differences in desires for 
esteem, control, and connectedness (Wilmot and Hocker, 2011).Therefore, con flicts seem to be inherent 
in all relationships including supply chain relationships because of the existing interdependences among 
partners.  
In the context of supply chains the existence of conflict seems to be unavoidable due to the complexity of 
relationships among the supply chain actors. There are providers of raw materials and components to 
contract manufacturers, product designers, logistics-management providers, distributors and resellers. 
Each of these actors has its own opinion and interest which could inevitably lead to conflict. However, 
conflicts need to be resolved as soon as possible since their existence simply hinders the effective 
functioning of supply chains and causes additional costs.  
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2.2 Theoretical model and development of hypotheses 
But how does power affect the conflict resolution in supply chains? Many authors put an emphasis on the 
necessity for symmetry and mutuality in order to foster longer-term relationships, whilst power 
asymmetries are associated with less stability and more conflict and are considered to be detrimental to 
sustaining a business relationship (Rokkan and Haugland, 2002). The party with more power would always 
use it for its own benefit, since the imbalance of power fosters abusive practices. For example, powerful 
manufacturers have been noted to use their position of strength to push for price concessions from 
suppliers in order to obtain superior economic returns (Halley and Beaulieu, 2001). 
However, there is a body of literature stating that power can be used as an effective tool for promoting 
harmonious relationships and solving conflicts. Condliffe (1944) stated that power, involving the possible 
use of force, is not necessarily evil but may be used to achieve moral purposes. Kumar (2005) emphasized 
the role of power in providing for effective coordination of the exchange relationship, rather than its 
potential for exploitation and argued that power is vital, because it can take the relationship out of the 
realm of chance and give it purpose, order, and direction. Therefore, there seems to be two views on the 
role of power for solving conflicts in supply chain relationships - positive and negative. 
In order to develop our theoretical model and research hypotheses about the effects of power on conflict 
we use the classification of power by Johnson et al. (1993) (figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical model of the effects of power on conflict (Source: Own illustration) 
 
The use of different kinds of power may have diverse effects on conflict. The studies of Gaski (1984), 
Lusch (1976) and  Hunt and Nevin (1974) suggest that the use of coercive power is associated with 
increased conflict, while the use of non-coercive power exhibit the opposite relationship. Other 
researchers have argued that the use of coercive power will lead its possessor to exploit the other party 
(Bannister, 1969; Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 1975), for example in order to negotiate lower costs, higher 
quality, reasonable delivery times, and special exigencies (Maloni and Benton, 1997), which is s een 
detrimental for the weaker actor (Stolte and Emerson, 1976). So coercion is the classical case of the 
negative side of power. A number of scientists found that the use of non-coercive power has a positive 
impact, since it aims at changing the attitude of the other party (Kähkönen, 2014) and results in a greater 
level of satisfaction of the weaker party than in the case of coercive power (Hunt and Nevin, 1974). Gaski 
(1984) stated that it is through reward power that partner perceptions are managed to cr eate harmonious 
and enduring interorganizational exchange relationships. The positive  effect of legitimate power can be 
observed in providing a positive effect on exchange relationships, as the distribution of power has become 
legitimate over time (Kalafatis, 2000). The study conducted by Lee and Low (2008) indicated that 
legitimate power positively affects satisfaction in business relationships. Based on this argumentation, we 
have developed the following research hypothesis about the effect of mediated po wer on conflict:  
Within a supplier-buyer relationship the use of mediated power negatively affects conflict (H1). 
Expert power is considered to be less effective than coercive and reward power because it is less flexible 
and not related to specific performance of supply chain members (Etgar, 1976). Besides, its effectiveness 
may decline over time. For example, expert advice, once given, may provide the supply chain actor with 
the ability to operate without such assistance in the future. Another major di sadvantage is that it may 
have a more limited scope of applicability than rewards and penalties. The fact that information is shared 
and exchanged may be convincing for the target of influence, since the power holder does it voluntarily. 
However, Payan and McFarland (2005) found that information exchange has a lower likelihood of 
compliance with the requirements of the power holder because it is the most unfocused kind of power 
and because it lacks specificity as to what needs to be done. As for the referent power, the use of a 
Conflict 
Mediated  
power 
Non-mediated 
power 
H1 - H2 + 
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positive image and good reputation by a supply chain leader may positively impress the supplier and 
foster the development of trust, since it is ranked highest among other kinds of power in connection to 
satisfaction and since high degrees of identification between supply chain members may be more 
associated with moral purpose and commitment rather than with the threat of punishment  (Lee and Low, 
2008). Therefore, we argue that non-mediated power affects conflict in the following way:  
Within a supplier-buyer relationship the use of non-mediated power positively affects conflict (H2). 
3 Empirical study  
3.1 Data and sample 
To test our research assumptions we conducted a series of expert interviews via telephone about 
relationships of international food processing companies with their suppliers in Russia. We contacted 
1000 companies of foreign origin registered in Russia as companies operating in the area of food 
processing with at least 10% of foreign direct investment capital. A total of 89 complete telephone 
interviews were conducted, which represents the response rate of 8.9%. We made a thorough selection of 
the interviewees who were chosen according to their leading positions in order to effectively gather 
relevant information (Blankertz, 1998; Merkens, 2000; Patton, 1990). Specifically, we employed an expert 
(concentration) sampling approach (Fritsch 2007; Patton, 1990). The persons chosen were in positions 
with a high level of concentration of appropriate information.  
Before contacting the companies from the database we made a thorough pre-test study by contacting 15 
experts from the field of agri-food business and conducting telephone conversations with them. This pre-
test allowed us to identify potential problems and to improve the questionnaire, which was designed in 
three languages (Russian, English and German) in order to allow the experts speaking different languages 
to participate in the questionnaire. The translation of the questionnaire was made by the author and 
cross-checked by two experts. The interviewees were first informed about the interviews via email. After 
receiving their consent, the calls were given at the time appointed by the interviewees.  
The survey tool contained three sections: 1) Introduction; 2) Mechanisms for managing agri-food supply 
chains; 3) Problems with partners. The questions were grouped according to the thematically connected 
blocks within each section. We applied the four-point Likert scala (Worcester and Burns, 1975) in order to 
avoid the neutral position. The answer option “don’t know” was also given in order to increase the 
reliability of the answers. One of the first questions which was asked was “Do you feel responsible for 
coordinating the supply chain of this product (“from the field to the fork”)?” Two answer options were 
given: “yes” and “no”. We selected the focal companies which were the target of our research by asking 
this question. As the results show, most of the respondents chose Russian as the interview language 
(97%). Only 2% chose English and 1% - German. Duration of interviews was between 10 and 45 minutes, 
which makes the average duration per interview about 16 minutes. 
The companies from our sample stem from a variety of different Western European and North -American 
countries. Altogether, the head offices of the companies originate from 27 different countries. The biggest 
group of the interviewed companies comes from Germany (21%).Some other important big groups were 
from the USA, France, the Netherlands and Italy. Also Asian countries (China and Singapore) were 
represented. The majority of the companies operated in Moscow and the Moscow region (81%). Among 
the respondents were general directors, sales managers, category managers, logistics managers, quality 
and supply chain managers, etc. 
3.2 Methodology 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) path modeling represents one of the techniques of Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM). SEM represents a statistical methodology which allows the causal relationships among 
several complex constructs composed of a number of separate indicators to be investigated.PLS has been 
enjoying increased popularity in many different scientific disciplines and areas of research recently. The 
idea of PLS was developed by Herman Wold as an econometric technique for statistical data analysis 
(Wold, 1966). This technique was designed for working with complex models and small sample sizes as 
compared to the number of variables and represents a modeling technique linking a block of response 
variables with a block of explanatory variables. PLS generally combines the features of Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and Multiple Regression (MR) and represents a second -generation multivariate 
statistical method for analysing indirectly measured causes and effects of different co ncepts in complex 
behavioural systems. PLS Path Modeling is able to simultaneously model the structural (relationships 
among latent variables) and the measurement paths (relationships between a latent variable and its 
manifest variables). The direction of pathways and arrows in the measurement model and the causality 
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between the latent variables and its indicators can either be described by a reflective or a formative mode 
(Albers and Hildebrandt 2006; Jarvis et al., 2003). 
Numerous researchers have addressed the advantages of PLS (Jöreskog and Wold, 1982; Fornell et. al., 
1990). One of the advantages of PLS is its ability to handle huge amounts of data in a situation when there 
is limited theoretical knowledge. PLS is considered to have a better ability for  estimating complex 
relationships. Very complex models with multiple latent variables and indicators can be estimated and 
analyzed with PLS because the algorithm treats the model step by step and does not face the model 
complexity as a whole in one single step.  
Besides, PLS has minimal demands on measurement scales, sample size, and residual distributions (Chin, 
1998). The PLS path modeling is more robust and it can be used even in cases when measurement models 
are falsely specified (Jarvis et al., 2003). It is also simple to use for both formative and reflective indicators 
and can be used to estimate latent constructs with only one manifest indicator (Hair et al., 2006). In 
addition, despite the fact that PLS is generally considered to be prediction orient ed, it can also be used for 
theory confirmation, since it can predict a set of dependent variables from a large set of independent 
variables (i.e., predictors). 
Another advantage of PLS is its ability to deal with small samples. Although there is no unanim ous 
agreement as to what a ‘small’ sample size really means, PLS is generally applicable in situations when the 
sample size is very small. There is a strong rule of thumb which allows the sample size be equal to: (1) ten 
times the scale with the largest number of formative indicators, or (2) ten times the largest number of 
structural paths directed at a particular construct in the structural model (Chin, 199 8). There is also the 
weak rule of thumb which suggests using a multiplier of five instead of ten for  the described requirements 
(Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989). Chin and Newsted (1999) used PLS for estimating a model with a sample size 
of 50. Others report on even lower numbers of observations possible (27 variables using two latent 
constructs with a data set consisting of ten cases) (Chin et al., 2003). Generally one should be cautious 
with smaller sample sizes, since they begin to lose their explanatory power and may represent 
problematic solutions (Nasser and Wisenbaker, 2003). However, this discussion should be continued in 
each individual case in order to able to reason about the appropriate technique for a certain sample size.  
The  advantages  of  PLS  have  encouraged its application more recently in agri -food business (Schulze et 
al., 2006; Gagalyuk et al., 2010; Gagalyuk, 2011; Herzlieb, 2011). Schulze et al. (2006) investigated 
relationship quality in the German pork and dairy sectors based on 566 face-to-face interviews. Gagalyuk 
(2011) investigated the goal achievement in supply chain networks on the example of the Ukrainian agri-
food business by using a data set of 101 branded food processing companies. PLS was also used for even 
smaller sample sizes (e.g., 67 – in Herzlieb (2011)). 
Therefore, the decision to use PLS in these studies was based on such considerations as small sample 
sizes; early stages of research development with high complexity and low theoretical information; 
theoretical problems such as inadmissible solutions (i.e., negative error) and factor indeterminacy; as well 
as the possibility to use both formative and reflective indicators simultaneously. The main advantages of 
using PLS can be summarized as follows. Firstly, PLS path modeling algorithm allows using both reflective 
and formative way of modeling without causing any problems. Secondly, PLS can be used to estimate 
models for fairly small samples. Thirdly, PLS can cope with complex models with a high number of latent 
and manifest constructs in relation to the number of observations without causing estimation problems. 
Fourthly, PLS path modeling uses few or no distributional requirements.  
3.3 Results of PLS path modeling 
The evaluation of results of the PLS path modeling is accomplished in two steps: 1) the assessment of the 
measurement (outer) model and 2) the assessment of the structural (inner) model (Chin, 1998).In our case 
the measurement model is a reflective one. The outer model is evaluated by examining the individual item 
reliabilities and convergent validity of the model. The individual item reliabilities are examined t hrough 
the factor loadings of the items on their respective constructs. According to Hair et al. (1998), an item is 
considered insignificant and removed from the model if its factor loading is less than 0.4. The remaining 
indicators represent more than 50% of the share of the variance of each indicator in respect to the 
corresponding latent variable and can be considered as the most reliable. The blue ovals represent the 
latent constructs, whereas the yellow rectangles represent the manifest variables  (figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of the model in SmartPLS (Source: Own illustration) 
In our case the measurement model is a reflective one and should be assessed according to its reliability 
and validity. Cronbach’s αis a measure of internal consistency and must not be lower than 0.6. In our case 
all variables except for Mediated power have their Cronbach’s αwithin the borders of the advised number. 
Unfortunately, the measure of Cronbach’s αfor Mediated power is 0.523 which is slightly lower than 0.6. 
In spite of this fact, the composite reliability is achieved for this variable as it is done for all the other 
variables. The composite reliability index is more reliable in assessing convergent validity because it takes 
into account the relative weights of the various indicators in a latent construct while Cronbach’s α 
assumes equal weights (Gyau and Spiller,  2009). 
 
Table 1. 
Results of the assessment of the measurement model 
Latent variables Cronbach’s α Composite Reliability AVE R
2
 
Conflict  0,901008 0,918490 0,559820 0,325711 
Mediated power 0,523012 0,803871 0,673210  
Non-mediated power 0,852497 0,889395 0,575616  
Source: Own accomplishment 
The composite reliability is a measure of internal consistency and must not be lower than 0.6. In our case 
it is even better, since it is over 0.8. The average variance extracted (AVE)should be higher than 0.5. AVE 
value means that a latent variable is able to explain more than half of the variance of its indicators on 
average. R
2
answers the question "How well does the model fit the data?" A rule of thumb which is applied 
for explorative studies is that R
2
 values lower than 0.1 are weak, between 0.1 and 0.2 are moderate and 
over 0.3 are strong (Acock, 2014). In the model the construct Conflict has the value of R
2 
0.326, which 
represents moderate assessment and considering the complexity and the explorative nature of the 
research model indicates a good fit. 
The next step is to evaluate the fit of the structural (inner) model. It is necessary to test the goodness-of-
fit of the path coefficients. In this case we use the method of t -statistics through resampling (Venaik et al., 
2001). We used the method of bootstrapping (samples = 200) to generate t -statistics to test the 
significance levels of standardized path estimates (Martinez-Ruiz and Aluja-Banet, 2009). In order to test 
the hypotheses one must quantify the paths’ significance (by means of a resampling method) and examine 
the absolute values of the relationships. Another way to assess the structural model is to multiply the 
beta (path) coefficients (b) and correlation coefficients (r) of each latent variable. The results indicate an 
approximate measure of the variance of the construct explained by the latent predictive variable. In this 
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case values of less than 1.5 % are not making significant contribution to their respective latent variables 
(Gyau and Spiller, 2009).  
Table 3. 
Results of the assessment of the structural model 
Hypotheses Constructs t-statistics 
Beta (path) 
coefficients (b) 
Correlation 
coefficient (r) 
b*r 
H1 Mediated power→ Conflict 1,620808 0,448307 0,494286 0,222 
H2 Non-mediated power → Conflict 3,025997 -0,288974** -0,360305 0,104 
Source: Own accomplishment 
According to the results the hypotheses did not have the expected sign. Statistical hypotheses testing 
have received a lot of criticism in recent years. Cohen (1994) criticized this technique by saying that it 
“does not tell us what we want to know” and “out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does”. It 
is also stated that this term is often misused leading to the misunderstandings in the meaning of 
theoretical or practical significance. Many authors state that this term is rather misleading, since it implies 
that a research result should be considered important because it is statistically significan t, or that it is not 
important because it is not statistically significant. For example, Gall (2001) states: “My claim, then, is that 
tests of statistical significance say virtually nothing about the importance of a research result.” Therefore, 
we think that it might be more important to consider which practical importance the research findings 
have. Obtaining statistically insignificant results could also be connected with insufficient sample size. 
Therefore, whether the statistical significance really has the subjective importance remains unclear. The 
discussion of the results in the Russian context is presented in the following section.  
4 Discussion and conclusions 
The central goal of our study was to investigate the role of power in conflict resolution in the context of 
agri-food supply chains in Russia. Specifically, we posited that the use of mediated power is negatively 
and the use of non-mediated power is positively related to conflict. The main idea behind this 
argumentation was that mediated power is only the kind of power which represents a conscious decision 
of the more powerful actor to exert influence on the behavior of the less powerful partner. Thus, we 
assumed that the non-mediated power is less focused and not related to the specific task that powerful 
actor wants the less power partner to fulfill. However, our assumptions turned out to be wrong.  
In contrast to our assumptions, the results of our analysis demonstrate that by increasing the use of 
mediated(coercive, reward, legal legitimate) power the degree of conflicts will rise. Therefore, we would 
advise not to use this kind of power in the agri-food processor-supplier relationships in Russia. On the first 
sight this result is not surprising. However, regarding the positive attitude the Russian culture has towards 
power (Hofstede, 2001) and hierarchical orders (Kadochnikov, 2004) one could have also expected a 
positive relationship between mediated power and conflict . This startling result might be perhaps 
explained by the industry structure in the Russian agrifood-business. As shown, differently to Western 
European supplier structures Russian agricultural suppliers are mostly large scale producers hold by large 
investors. Furthermore, due to the former business ethics managers are still afraid of taking initiative and 
making their own decisions (Arino et al., 1997). In this context , for example the use of rewards could be 
evaluated skeptical as they promote self initiatives exceeding the basic agreement.  
The results of our model also indicate that non-mediated (expert, informational, referent, traditional 
legitimate) power has a positive effect on conflict resolution and, therefore, should be used more often by 
supply chain practitioners. This is also the opposite of our expected theoretical a ssumption. As we have 
surveyed focal companies with FDI one could expect that such companies are accustomed to knowledge 
transfer. Furthermore, as shown above, Russian firms are strong in learning from foreign companies 
(Yudaeva et al., 2000). Hence, suppliers value the knowledge of FDI embracing knowledge transfer.  
Overall status symbols are being more valued in Russian culture than in the western European one 
(Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). To some extend doing business with a ‘foreigner’ is regarded in Eastern 
Europe as a kind of status symbol. Gagalyuk and Hanf (2009) were able to show on the example of the 
Ukrainian agri-food business that suppliers of well known foreign processors had less problems obtaining 
loans to favorable interest rates. Hence, referent power is able to smoothen conflicts in the supply chain. 
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Overall, our findings document thatpower is not necessary a negative or evil force as it was already stated 
in earlier studies on power (Condliffe, 1944;Hingley, 2005, Hoejmose et a., 2013).Analyzing supply chain 
networks in the agri-food business it gets evident that power asymmetries are existing due to their 
hierarchical structure. The example of the Russian agri-food business shows that these power 
asymmetries in many conflicts hamper the management of the whole chain. The power asymmetry is a 
natural state for any relationship including supply chain relationships. To believe that power asymmetry is 
bad is not correct. More powerful leaders in supply chain networks known as ‘chain captains’ c an use the 
power advantage for the good of the whole network. Moreover, weaker partners in asymmetric 
relationships can benefit from the existence of ‘chain captains’ and their strategies. Power asymmetry is 
not a barrier in supply chain networks.  
By and large, the findings of the current study provide support that power could have a profound impact 
on conflict in supply chain networks. However, in order to successfully resolve conflicts in supply chains 
the knowledge of different power types is essential. Depending on the type of power (mediated vs. non-
mediated), its effect on conflict may be completely different. It can destroy a cooperative relationship or 
help solving problems in supply chains. Our recommendations can help managers to understand differ ent 
interactions of these factors, and to design their management practices to successfully manage conflicts 
in supply chains. We hope that our research results and ideas will be of interest for both academics and 
practitioners and will encourage them to rethink their current practices and ideas and to use power as an 
effective tool in problem-solving and constructive ways to enhance the  performance  of  a supply chain 
network  as  a  whole  as  well  as  of its  individual  members. 
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